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Abstract—Programmable management framework have paved
the way for managing devices in the network. Lately, emerging
paradigm of Software Defined Networking (SDN) have rev-
olutionized programmable networks. Designers of networking
applications i.e. Internet of things (IoT) have started investigating
potentials of SDN paradigm in improving network management.
IoT envision interconnecting various embedded devices surround-
ing our environment with IP to enable internet connectivity.
Unlike traditional network architectures, IoT are characterized
by constraint in resources and heterogeneous inter connectivity
of wireless and wired medium. Therefore, unique challenges for
managing IoT are raised which are discussed in this paper.
Ubiquity of IoT have raised unique security challenges in IoT
which is one of the aspect of management framework for IoT.
In this paper, security threats and requirements are summarized
in IoT extracted from the state of the art efforts in investigating
security challenges of IoT. Also, SDN based security service
provisioning framework for IoT is proposed.
Index Terms—IoT; Software Defined Security; Security in
IoT; Software Defined Networking; Software Defined based IoT
(SDIoT),
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent revolution in embedded technologies and Internet
have made it possible for the things surrounding us to be
interconnected with each other [1]. It is expected in the coming
era IoT devices will be part of the environment around us
which will generate enormous amount of data. Processing is
required on the generated data which is then presented in an
understandable form to the requester.
Mobile operators, software developers, integrators and alter-
native access technology are involved in the IoT ecosystem [2].
There are many different application domains where IoT plays
crucial role like manufacturing, health-care, transport, admin-
istration, insurance, public safety, local community, metering,
road safety, traffic management, tracking, etc. IoT enables
interconnection with people’s devices exchanging information
and performing actions with out humans involved. This is
possible by amalgamating heterogeneous communication in-
frastructure. This has motivated the researcher to design smart
gateways which connects IoT devices with traditional internet.
Most recently, enabling Everything as a Service model by
merging IoT and Cloud Computing is the focus of attention
in the research community [3] (see figure 1).
In order to tackle management problems in IoT, resource
management frameworks have received considerable attention.
SDN paradigm offers an attractive solution to manage IoT
resources which is been lately under focus. Proposal of a
Fig. 1. IoT and Cloud Convergence
framework for managing traffic and network resources in an
IoT environment is given in [4]. Other efforts which have
adopted SDN based approach to solve management issues in
IoT can be found in [5][6][7][8][9][10].
Numerous security challenges are illuminated with the in-
creasing complexity of IoT networks. There is a desire for a
complete framework which manages data generated from the
IoT devices. Up till now there is no SDN based comprehensive
security framework for IoT network. For managing security of
IoT networks the promise of SDN to manage IoT resources
makes it a prime candidate for management framework. Con-
tribution in this paper is twofold which are as follows.
1) Identified and discussed management challenges of IoT.
Furthermore in this paper security management of IoT
is dealt with and security issues, threats, attacks and
requirements in IoT are identified.
2) Proposed SDN based framework for provisioning secu-
rity services over IoT network.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
introduction on software defined networking paradigm. Man-
agement challenges of IoT are discussed in section 3. Section
4 gives detail insight into security issues and requirements
of IoT. Section 5 discusses security threats and attacks in
IoT. In section 6, general introduction to software defined
networking framework for IoT (SDIoT) is given. Section
7, presents the proposal of SDN based IoT framework for
security service provisioning. In the end, conclusion and future
work is discussed.
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Fig. 2. SDN Architecture
II. INTRODUCTION TO SDN
Developments in programmable networks by Martin
Casado, Nick Mckeown and Scott Shenker at Stanford Univer-
sity resulted in a novel paradigm of SDN. Road to SDN with a
brief discussion on the history of programmable networks can
be found in [11]. SDN enables network administrators to man-
age network services by abstracting high level functionalities.
Such abstraction is provided by separating control plane from
the data plane. With such separation network management is
simplified.
Appropriate forwarding decisions for the end network de-
vices which are SDN enabled are given by a special central
node called SDN controller. Openflow is the most widely used
protocol used by the end devices to communicate with the
SDN controller. Openflow supported devices are often called
Openflow switches. An OpenFlow switch separates the data
plane and control plane functions. High level routing decisions
are moved to the controller. Switch have the data plane portion.
Figure 2. illustrates a typical SDN architecture.
Secure connection with the network devices and SDN con-
troller is established by Openflow control message exchanges.
Furthermore, the message exchange result in installing for-
warding instructions. Flow tables in the switches are main-
tained by the data plane. In flow tables, each flow table entry
contains a set of packet fields to match an action (such as
send-out-port, modify-field, or drop). Upon receiving a packet
which is never seen by the Openflow switch and no matching
flow entries is found. The switch sends such packet to the
controller for making decision. Decision taken by the SDN
controller can be of dropping the packet or adding flow entry
in the Openflow switch for forwarding in future. Flow tables
have flow entries which are defined by flow rules defined in
Openflow. Heterogeneous network changes result in dynamic
modification of flow rules.
III. MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES OF IOT
Conventional network management techniques are inap-
plicable in IoT due to distinctive challenges. IoT devices
connected to the internet via gateway is shown in figure
Fig. 3. IoT devices connected with Internet via IoT Gateway.
3. CoAP ( Constrained Application) protocol running over
6LowPAN is used for communication between gateway and
IoT nodes. IoT network devices are not sufficient in resources.
Usually in IoT network high fault rates are experienced due to
shortfall in energy and connectivity interruptions. To improve
the efficiency of the network main concerns are of monitoring
and administration of node communication. A typical manage-
ment solution should provide various management functions
integrating configuration, security operation, administration of
devices and services of IoT. Following set of functions should
be provided by management solution for IoT.
A. Fault Tolerance
Failures are encountered in the IoT network for various
reasons. Depletion of batteries is one possibility. Effects
on the sensing components results in inaccurate readings
disseminated by the devices. Vigorous changes in network
topology and partitions in the network is created due to
inherent nature of adhoc wireless network links tendency of
failures. Due to erroneous nature of communication, delivered
packets get corrupted. Packet losses are not experienced due
to failures of link but are also caused by congestion. Multihop
communication nature of IoT worsen all the fault scenarios
discussed. Efforts in this direction is summarized in [12].
B. Energy Management
IoT network are deployed in distant region. Due to scarcity
of energy resource in IoT and its deployment in distant region
depletion of available energy happens frequently. Substitute
of energy is impossible. Balanced energy management among
supply and load is required to avoid energy scarcity. Data
traffic from devices can be controlled to balance energy in the
network which is possible by techniques such as duty cycling,
scheduling sleep and wake-up modes of devices studied in
[13]. Management solution for IoT should address the energy
issue by having essential function of energy management for
smooth operation of IoT network.
C. Load balancing
Load balancing can be used for extending lifetime of IoT
which results in lessening energy utilization. Load balancing
is possible by techniques such as clustering. In clustering
technique IoT network is organized into cluster which is
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coordinated by a cluster head. With such configuration there
are numerous benefits, such as reduction in routing table
size, conservation of network bandwidth, lengthening network
lifetime, reduction in redundant data packets and decreasing
energy consumption. This makes load balancing an essential
component of management solution for IoT. Efforts in this
direction can be found in [14].
D. Security Management
Security, privacy and trust are essential requirements in
IoT. Due to resource constraint nature of IoT devices the
the provisioning of security has become more challenging.
Novel techniques for provisioning of security is required as
conventional security schemes are inapplicable. This poses
unique challenges for management framework designer of IoT.
Research on security management can be found in [15].
In this paper, security management issues of IoT network
are dealt with.In addition, major security issues and require-
ments put forth by IoT are identified. In order to address these
issues and requirements SDN based framework to provision
security services over IoT is proposed.
IV. SECURITY ISSUES AND REQUIREMENTS IN IOT
In this section, major security issues and requirements are
identified which are imposed by resource constrained IoT
network. Traditional solutions are inapplicable in the domain
of IoT due to resource constraint nature of IoT devices. In
this section latest research efforts in each of the issues and
requirements are outlined.
A. Privacy in IoT
IoT finds its uses in various heterogeneous fields which
include remote monitoring of patients, control of energy
consumption, traffic control, production chain, smart shopping
etc. Hence, privacy in IoT is a prime security issue which
needs full attention from researchers in academia and industry.
There is a desire need to propose protocols and management
framework for handling privacy in IoT. Latest attempts to
address the issue can be found in literature such as [16], [17],
[18].
B. Lightweight Cryptographic Framework for IoT
IoT is usually scarce in resources and faces number of
challenges such as limitation in power and bandwidth, .etc.
Hence traditional heavy weight algorithms cannot be opted
for IoT. There is a desire need to investigate how to make
symmetric and asymmetric algorithms lightweight for IoT.
Most recently, various efforts for lightweight solution for IoT
can be found in [19], [20], [19], [21]. Some of the existing
lightweight cryptographic solutions includes HIGHT, RC5 and
PRESENT.
C. Secure Routing and Forwarding in IoT
IoT not only require provisioning of security services but
often experience problems in routing and forwarding the data.
Hence, there is a desire need to secure the routing algorithm
for IoT. IoT routing usually experiences selective forwarding
attacks, sink hole attack, Hello flood attack, Wormhole attack,
clone ID and sybil attacks. Efforts have been putforward by the
researchers to address routing attacks in IoT. A comprehensive
state of the art in securing routing for WSN can be found in
[22]. Latest efforts in proposing secure routing for IoT can be
found in [23], [24], [25].
D. Robustness and Resilient Management in IoT
IoT applications require robustness as failures due to se-
curity attacks may not be affordable for low power devices.
Hence, an ideal IoT management framework should have
mechanisms to prevent such situations and ensure fault tol-
erance against security failures. Efforts in this direction can
be found in [26], [27], [28], [29].
E. Management Framework for IoT
SDN offers tremendous amount of opportunities to manage
future Internet. The conventional network protocols and equip-
ment is not able to support huge traffic amount, mobility and
elevated level of scalability. In literature, authors have pro-
posed architecture for IoT [30]. Most of the researchers who
have realized the potential of SDN for managing IoT network
have proposed architecture which apply SDN and network
virtualization for managing IoT networks [30]. Interestingly,
authors uptill now have discussed at a very primitive level to
provide security for IoT using SDN. Some of the latest work in
this direction can be found in [31], [6], [8], [32]. A complete
security framework to provide security in industrial IoT has
received very little attention.
F. Access Control in IoT
Access control allows only authorized users to access the
resources. In any typical IoT scenario like Smart Home, lack
of proper access control mechanisms could result in disclosing
sensitive and privileged information. It is very important that
the user data is only disclosed to authorized parties.
G. Trust in IoT
In safety critical IoT applications (like health care), the
trustworthiness of sensors and sensor’s data is important. Any
malicious sensor node or malicious sensor data can lead to
a disaster. It is important to calculate trust and reputation of
different entities involved in the IoT ecosystem.
H. Audit Control for IoT
IoT environment needs to know when their services are
accessed and by whom. This will ensure in maintaining higher
level of security. Maintaining an audit trail in IoT services is
a challenging task. Having a centralized view of IoT network
with SDN managed framework can help in logging activities
across IoT network.
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I. Secure Network Access
IoT devices when joining the network need to be authorized
in order to avail services from the network. In case, a malicious
node becomes part of the network it can perform malicious
actions which either cause disruption in IoT services or
modify the critical data with in the IoT network. There is
a desire need to authorize IoT nodes entering the network
with authentication algorithms and enforce security policies
in order to inhibit IoT nodes to perform unauthorize actions.
Such issues have been looked upon and discussed in literature
such as in [33].
J. Secure Storage
Recent advances in flash memory storage technology have
enabled IoT devices such as smart objects to have enormous
amount of storage space. Most recently, IoT applications
store data in IoT devices for improved performance [34].
Protecting sensitive data information have received attention
from the research community. Stored data in IoT devices can
be tampered and modified by malicious nodes or applications
with in the network. Efforts in this domain can be found in
[35] and [36].
K. Tamper Resistance
Malicious entities within the network can take hold of the
IoT device or devices which can be tampered. Hence, an IoT
device should be resistant to such tampering and fulfills all the
security requirements. In literature, need for resistance against
tampering is an issue that need to be addressed [37]. Hence,
robust security management solution is desired which ensures
resilience against such tampering.
L. User Identification and Identity Management
A node joining the network have to be authenticated. Along
with authentication it is to be made sure that joining node is
validated with the policies applicable to the particular joining
node. It is desire to maintain ID of all the nodes in the network.
Identity management is required for IoT and effort in this
direction can be found in [38].
M. Availability
IoT devices usually sense data which is collected, aggre-
gated and used by IoT application. IoT applications apply data
analytics to infer from the collected data which is then used for
making decisions. It is possible that attacks can be launch on
IoT devices which hinders their proper operation and availabil-
ity leading to unnecessary delays and errors in analyzing data.
Availability can be targeted by (Denial of Service) DoS or
(Distributed Denial of Service) DDoS attacks on IoT nodes or
network. DoS and DDoS have received considerable attention
from the research community and notable efforts can be found
in [39].
V. SECURITY THREATS AND ATTACKS IN IOT
This section lists the security threats and attacks, which
are applicable to IoT ecosystem. Efforts in summarizing
challenges of security in IoT can be found in [40] [41] [42]
[43] [44] [45]. Detail taxonomy of security challenges can be
found in [41].On the other hand, comprehensive identification
of security challenges and requirements in IoT architecture
is also carried out by various researchers most notable of
them can be found in [43] [44] [45] [40]. Challenges from
all the above efforts are summarized which are required to be
addressed by a comprehensive security management solution
for IoT. These threats and challenges are given below.
A. Eavesdropping
Because IoT involves wireless communication interface it
is obviously vulnerable to eavesdropping. IoT services are
expected to contain sensitive data, therefore it is important
to protect the data of IoT connected objects against an
eavesdropper for possible data leakages. Consider a Smart
home environment where IoT objects control and monitor
different activities. It is of major importance that the personal
information of the smart home owner is kept private and the
attacker/eavesdropper is not able to tap the communication
between IoT devices.
B. Data Corruption
Instead of eavesdropping or listening to the data, an attacker
can also try to modify the data which is transmitted over the
air between the IoT devices. A simple motivation here would
be to disturb the communication such that the receiving device
is not able to understand and process the data sent by the other
device. This attack is a simple form of DoS attack where the
devices are not been able to perform the required operation
over the data. Other then that this attack does not allow the
attacker to manipulate the actual data.
C. Data Modification
IoT nodes are expected to exchange critical data with other
services and some time also with intermediate entities i.e.
authorities, service providers and control centers. This put
stringent requirement that the sensed, stored and transmitted
data must not be tampered either maliciously or accidentally.
In data modification the attacker is capable of manipulat-
ing/modifying the data in such a way that the receiving device
is unable to detect modification and treats the input to be valid.
This is very different and sophisticated from just data corrup-
tion attack. It is crucial to design reliable and dependable IoT
applications secure against active modification.
D. Identity Spoofing Attack
IoT device’s identity can be compromised through which
malicious traffic is sent to victim nodes in the network. This
is a devastating attack which can disrupt the normal operation
of IoT network. This can also be used to launch DoS and
DDoS attacks in the network. There is a strong desire for a
robust and resilient techniques for validating IoT devices in
the network to prevent spoofing.
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E. Injection Attack
IoT devices run lightweight code to assist IoT applications
in sensing, data collection or performing some activity in a
particular region in a field. There is a possibility a malicious
code can be injected by the attacker on IoT devices which
then perform malicious actions with the intention of disrupting
normal operation of IoT network or application. Malicious
code can also sabotage IoT device in the network.
F. Denial of Service and Insider Detection in IoT
Emerging technology of IoT experiences severe attacks
in IoT. Insider attack is one of the devastating attacks that
has received attention from researchers [46]. It is desired to
address the issue by incorporating a mechanism in security
management framework for IoT.
G. Attacks on Availability
Availability is extremely important for IoT services which
enable access from anywhere at any time in order to provide
information continuously. Existing security protocols fails to
effectively prevent attacks on availability of IoT services.
Lets consider an example of Smart Home application, where
the sensor nodes are incapable of handling huge number of
requests due to resource limitations. Attacker can leverage
this limitation to launch DoS attack by sending huge volume
of false service requests. Since the wireless transmissions are
also battery hungry operation, unnecessary handling of service
request will also drain the battery of IoT devices. Security
management framework for IoT should be able to mitigate
DoS attacks in IoT. Efforts in dealing with DoS attacks in IoT
can be found in [47], [48].
H. Impersonation Attacks
In an IoT ecosystem, both the service provider and service
consumer need to make sure that the service is accessed by
the authenticated users and it is also offered by an authentic
source. It is very crucial to have strong authentication mech-
anisms deployed to prevent any form of impersonation.
VI. SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORK BASED FRAMEWORK
FOR IOT
The heterogeneity of IoT multi-networks and its complexity
is a challenge to organize and to make effective the use
of heterogeneous resources with the objective of managing
and securing as numerous jobs as possible. The researchers
have considered SDN a hot candidate for solving resource
management needs of IoT environment. This is due to inherent
nature of SDN paradigm which is managed by a centralized
controlling agent i.e. controller. Current practical implementa-
tion of SDN technologies are long way dealing with diversified
and vigorous demands of IoT multi-network. Although, there
are various differing SDN based solution for IoT a generic
architecture can be constructed from the existing solutions
in the literature as shown in Figure 4. In this architecture,
IoT applications and services are implemented at application
layer. SDN controller related functionalities is implemented
Fig. 4. SDN Archtiecture for IoT.
at control layer. While IoT devices and gateway exists at
infrastructure layer. The control software interacts with the
IoT application services at application layer and IoT devices
at infrastructure layer using APIs. Various efforts in SDN
based solutions for IoT can be found in literature some of
the important ones are [49], [6], [8], [50] and [7].
1) Sensor Openflow Switch(es): The IoT nodes are usually
laid out in clusters with cluster head, which is a resource
sufficient device that communicates with the IoT gateway. In
order to implement SDN techniques the IoT nodes acting as
relays or switching device play the role of sensor openflow
switches. In contrast to traditional network components over
the Internet, the IoT nodes are constrained in resources and
require a lightweight openflow protocol for communication
with the low power devices. The detailed design for the
lightweight Openflow in IoT nodes requires resource efficient
approach.
VII. SDN BASED IOT FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY
SERVICE PROVISIONING
Current architecture of IoT contains sensor nodes (IoT
devices) connected to the conventional Internet via the IoT
gateway. This architecture (IP connected IoT) is increasingly
becoming popular today, where smart devices also referred
to as the things are integrated with the Internet to form
IoT. Low power Wireless Personal Area Network running
with IPv6 (6LoWPAN) is the popular technology used as a
communication technology.
SDN makes network services agile and flexible such that
they can be automatically deployed and programmed. It further
simplifies network management by separating the control
plane (network intelligence that make data forwarding de-
cisions) from data plane (forwarding elements). The control
plane functions are moved into central Controller which acts
as the brain regulating the whole paradigm.
In order to address the issues discussed in this paper SDN
based framework for providing security services to IoT net-
work is proposed. The framework consists of an IoT controller
and SDN based security controller (see figure. 5). Both of these
controllers are located in IoT gateway, which communicates
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Fig. 5. Proposed SDN based Management and Security Framework for IoT
with the IoT devices. Most commonly used topology by IoT
network is cluster based topology. Where cluster head manages
a cluster of IoT devices.
The proposed SDN based IoT framework essentially com-
prise of three main components.
1) IoT Controller.
2) SDN based Security Controller.
3) Sensor Openflow Switch(es) (briefly discussed above).
A. IoT Controller
The IoT controller act as a middle tier collecting information
from IoT devices and transmitting it to application services for
data analytics. It is responsible for data collection, aggregation
and transmission of data to the back end. This is realized
through a monitoring agent that collects data across the IoT
network as shown in figure 5.
B. SDN based Security Controller
The SDN based security controller is also placed in the IoT
gateway and run on top of the IoT controller. In order to realize
security provisioning with the IoT network the SDN based
security controller interacts with the IoT controller to monitor
the flows. The security controller utilize SDN techniques to
provide different security services across IoT network. The
SDN based controller interacts with security applications at the
application plane to provision i) Privacy ii) Trust iii) Key Man-
agement iv) Access Control v) Service Access Authentication
across IoT network and vi) Security Attack Mitigation. Figure
5. shows the SDN based framework for provisioning security
where the security services are implemented at application
plane of the SDN architecture. The network administrator will
Fig. 6. Privacy process
enforce security policies through the security applications by
using custom API.
Security services at application plane will require status
of the network nodes in IoT. Flow samples required by the
network application is given by SDN based controller at
the control plane which has the whole global view of the
network. SDN based IoT controller have services which are
implemented as modules to provision security services across
IoT network. These modules are as follows.
C. Privacy Module
This component will preserve privacy in the IoT network.
Privacy means that the data generated by the devices need to
be transmitted anonymously without revealing any information
this to the intermediate or unauthorized nodes attempting to
eaves drop on data. Generated data from IoT devices are
collected and aggregated at the IoT controller. Privacy in the
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Fig. 7. SMC Computations
Fig. 8. Privacy Module
process of data collection and aggregation has to be ensured in
IoT network which can be compromised by adversary either
at collection or aggregation. SDN controller enables flows
from each device on the IoT controller to centrally verify the
authenticity of data originated from a device. This is possible
by public key infrastructure (PKI) when the device is joined
and registered the cryptographic credential valid during the
lifetime of device is given.
Feasibility of PKI in low power devices has been stud-
ied a lot by the research community. It is often argued to
be computationally intensive and practically not possible in
IoT. Lately, making PKI feasible for IoT is under focus by
the research community [51][52] and ECC ( Elliptic Curve
Cryptography) is being employed to adopt PKI in IoT [53].
Originated data from each device is encrypted by public key
of the gateway which is then signed by the private key of
the device. Encrypted packets in the flows from devices in
the IoT network are then verified through SDN controller by
the privacy application. In order to preserve privacy of the
aggregated data Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) [54]
is incorporated which originated from the work of generating
and exchanging secrets among two parties [55]. SMC is used
in preserving privacy [56]. The principle of SMC works in a
manner in which computation is secure when no party have
Fig. 9. Trust Module
the knowledge of anything except for the input and the result.
Mathematically, given inputs
(n1, n2, ...nn)
from the sources
(1, 2, 3, ...n)
which are to be processed by a trusted intermediate component
as
f(n1, n2, ...nn) = y
and then announce the results. Intermediate trusted component
is a trusted third party (TTP) which keep the process anony-
mous by aggregating inputs from the devices. In our model,
SDN controller along with privacy preserving application acts
as a TTP to perform SMC and preserve privacy of the whole
data collection process. Figure 8. shows the outline of the
privacy module.
Privacy preserving process as shown in figure 6 and 7. is
as follows
Step 1: IoT devices join the network by sending their
request to the gateway which is collected by the IoT controller
and passed on to the SDN controller which registers the device.
Step 2: Cryptographic credentials for confidentiality, in-
tegrity and SMC is generated by the privacy application which
is stored for a registering device.
Step 3: Encrypted packets are sent from a device as a flow
which is accounted by the SDN controller and along with
privacy application verifies it and runs SMC algorithm. The
computed result over inputs from IoT device is then provided
to the back end application or data analytics possibly hosted in
a cloud or if needed to the IoT devices for further processing.
D. Trust Module
Statistics of the IoT flows will be used to generate trust
values across the IoT network. These trust values will be
maintained by keeping a moving average over the historical
statistics of IoT flows. An untrusted IoT node or flow attempt-
ing to manipulate the network will fail the trust evaluation test.
In an IoT network there will be service requester and service
provider. Service requester can be a thing or a user requesting
a certain service. Service provider will first calculate the
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Fig. 10. Trust Evaluation Process
trust values of the nodes in collaboration with neighboring
nodes. Trust values are computed on the basis of history
maintained by keeping account of previous interactions of a
device who’s trust is to be computed with the neighboring
device. Trust assessment application is inspired by [57] and
[58]. For simplicity let us define history, if a binary random
variable
(eab(i))
indicates an ith encounter between node a and b.
(eab(i))
can assume value of 1 if b’s action is cooperate and 0
otherwise. Then history H defined for a set of n encounters
between a and b is represented by:
Hab = eab(1), eab(2), ..., eab(n)
Lets represent reputation of node between a and b for an
ith encounter as follows:
Rab(i) ∈ [0, 1]
As node a interacts with b the quantity
Rab(i)
is updated with time as a’s perception with b changes
Trust value is then given as
T (i) = E[R(i)|H(i)]
Higher the trust value for a particular node in the network
higher the expectation that particular node will reciprocate
with the other entity involved in the communication.
Lets assume that a particular node E who’s trust is to
be computed have neighboring nodes A, B, C and D who’s
weights are given as
[wa, wb, wc, wd]
. Then the trust of E is given as:
T (E) = wa ∗ T (A) + wb ∗ T (B) + wc ∗ T (C) + w ∗ dT (D)
Hence, trust is computed by taking into account the inter-
actions of the node who’s trust is to be computed with the
neighboring nodes in the network.
Figure 9. shows the outline of trust module. Trust Module
process is as follows.
Step 1: The request from each node is sent as encrypted to
the gateway. Request is collected by the IoT controller which
is then relayed to SDN controller. SDN controller accounts
flows in the network.
Step 2: Trust assessment for each request from either the
thing or service is carried out by trust application. At this step
historical data of trust evaluation is taken as an input to assess
new trust values.
Step 3: Updated trust values are used to make decision
about the policies to be enforced based on new trust compu-
tation. These policies apply to both devices and service.
Step 4: Based on trust assessment on updated values
computed by the trust application the policies generated for
the device may be sent to the device via IoT controller. Policy
ensures that no device in future can perform illegal operations
or access.
Trust assessment application process is as follows. Figure
10. shows how the process works.
Step 1: Upon receiving the request for trust evaluation,
nodes involve in servicing the request are assessed in case an
IoT service application interacts with the devices. For node
to node communication historical interaction between the two
nodes are assessed for trust evaluation.
Step 2: Lets say group of nodes A, B are involved for
servicing request from the IoT service i then historical inter-
actions and reputations of the neighboring nodes with A, B
are evaluated. For simplicity it is assumed A have neighbor
node R , B have neighbor node V. Historical interactions for
1,...,n and reputation are given as
Har = ear(1), ear(2), ..., ear(n)
,
Hbv = ebv(1), ebv(2), ..., ebv(n)
,
Rar = Rar(1), Rar(2), ..., Rar(n)
,
Rbv = Rbv(1), Rbv(2), ..., Rbv(n)
.
Step 3: Trust value for neighboring nodes with the nodes
involved in communication A, B (at an instance x lying
somewhere between 1, ..., n historical interactions) is then
given as
Tar(x) = E[Rar(x)|Har(x)]
,
Tbv(x) = E[Rbv(x)|Hbv(x)]
. Trust for nodes A and B with given weights of neighboring
nodes R and V
wr, wv
www.ijacsa.thesai.org 8 | P a g e
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,
Vol. 7, No. 12, 2016
Fig. 11. Key Management Module
Fig. 12. Key Distribution using ECDH
is given as
Ta = wr ∗ Tar(x)
,
Tb = wv ∗ Tbv(x)
.
Step 4: Service i then assess the trust values of nodes A,
B and proceed with its communication.
E. Key Management
Considering the IoT resource requirements, key manage-
ment module will implement lightweight key distribution
scheme. Recently, efforts in light weight key distribution
schemes have received considerable attention from the re-
search community [59], [60] ,[61] and [62]. Elliptic Curve
Cryptography based Diffie Hellman (ECDH) is a hot can-
didate for a lightweight key distribution scheme in IoT.
Apart from key distribution scheme the module will imple-
ment lightweight key generation algorithm and revocation.
Lightweight revocation have received attention from the com-
munity such as in [63]. The Keys generated by the module will
be used by the IoT nodes and security modules to implement
security services in the IoT network. When a device join a
network crypto keys for a device are generated and stored in
storage. Upon revocation update takes place replacing the keys
in the storage. Figure 11. shows the outline of key management
module. Key management module process is as follows.
Step 1: Device joins the network and get registered.
Step 2: Key generation request is then initiated via SDN
controller for a device from key management application.
Step 3: Crypto keys are generated and stored in the storage
for a device.
Step 4: Generated keys are distributed to the devices using
a key distribution algorithm.
Step 5: Key renewal and revocation process is carried out on
the recommendations of flow analyzer to revoke list of nodes.
Keys stored in the storage are expired and any data encrypted
with the expired keys will not be considered valid.
Step 6: Keys generated are stored in the storage and
distributed to the devices using a distribution algorithm.
Key generation process is as follows.
Step 1: Key management module and nodes for ECDH in
the network agree on curve C. For each exchange between
node (A) and node (B), node (A) generates a secret number f.
This secret number f is used to compute corresponding public
point which is computed as
U = (qf , wf ) = Cf
B generate a secret number g with the use of which a
corresponding public point is computed
U = (qg, wg) = Cg
.
Key distribution scheme based on ECDH is as follows.
Figure 12. shows how the process works.
Step 1: Compute the keys for nodes A and B,
U = (qf , wf ) = Cf
and
U = (qg, wg) = Cg
by using elliptic curve cryptography.
Step 2:
CfandCg
are exchanged over an insecure channel. Both the nodes can
compute the shared secret as k =
fCg = gCf
.
F. IoT and Service Access Authentication
IoT nodes and services will use the associated service crypto
keys to access. The authentication algorithm will use the keys
to authenticate the IoT nodes during the join time and any
network element accessing the IoT service. There are various
authentication algorithms for WSN proposed in the literature
such as in [64], [65]. The keys to authenticate the access of the
IoT services are called service access keys to ensure legitimate
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Fig. 13. IoT and Service Access Authentication Module
Fig. 14. Authentication Process
access of the IoT nodes by the service. A mutual authentication
algorithm is used that authenticates the two parties at the same
time using a challenge response authentication protocol. Figure
13. shows the outline of IoT and service access authentication
module. The IoT and service access authentication process is
as follows.
Step 1: Device upon joining get registered
Step 2: Crypto keys to access the service by the IoT nodes
are distributed to the devices.
Step 3: IoT service wishing to access IoT nodes in future
requests the IoT and service access authentication application
to register and pass on the credentials to IoT services.
Step 4: When a service is requested by the IoT devices the
authentication algorithm authenticates the devices.
Step 5: On the contrary if the device access is requested
by the IoT services then the authentication algorithm authenti-
cates the services based on the credential given to the service
in step 3.
Fig. 15. Access Control Module
Fig. 16. Access Control Process
Authentication algorithm is shown in figure 14.
Step 1: When the network is deployed key distribution
algorithm as described in the key management section will
distribute the keys to the devices. Likewise, any IoT service
wishing to gain access to IoT nodes will have the credentials
by using key distribution algorithm.
Step 2: An IoT device or service wishing to gain access
sends a challenge using credentials as given in step 1 to the
IoT and service access authentication process. The process
responds by answering the challenge using the credentials
from step1 at the same time sending a challenge back to the
IoT device.
Step 3: IoT device or service verifies the answer and at
the same time responds to the challenge given by the IoT
and service access authentication module using the credentials
from step1.
Step 4: The IoT and service access authentication module
verifies the answer from the IoT device or service, hence
authenticating the device using the credentials from step1.
G. Access Control
The gateway will have a database of access control policies
which are to be followed by the IoT nodes and the flows
generated during the registration process. Access control al-
gorithm will authorize, authenticate, approve access of the IoT
resources based on access control policies. ABAC ( Attribute
www.ijacsa.thesai.org 10 | P a g e
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,
Vol. 7, No. 12, 2016
Fig. 17. Security Attack Mitigation Module
based access control ) is employed for IoT. ABAC is used
in IoT for access control which can be seen in [66]. During
the registration process access structure based on attributes is
assigned to the device joining the network. SDN controller
assists the access control module to implement the access
control by constructing attribute access structure on the flows
generated by the devices. Figure 15. shows the outline of
access control module. Access control module process is as
follows.
Step 1: When a device joins and registers, the policies are
constructed on the basis of access structure assigned by the
access control module
Step 2: Policies for a device are generated and stored in
the storage.
Step 3: Based on the policies generated for a device,
policies are enforced on the devices by the SDN controller
via IoT controller. These policies influences the IoT devices
access operations on IoT services.
Access control algorithm is shown in Figure 16. The process
is as follows.
Step 1: Upon initiation of device registration request the
access control application initiates policy creation process.
Step 2: Access structure is assigned to a device which is
constructed by using access tree derived from attributes for a
particular flow or user in the network.
Step 3: Policy on the basis of access structure is derived
and stored in the storage.
Step 4: Flow initiated from a device accesses IoT network
which is then regulated by the policies stored in the storage.
The flow is granted access influenced by the policy.
H. Security Attack Mitigation Agent
The algorithm in the mitigation agent will use the current
status of the IoT network and its flows to detect possible
malicious activity in the network. Threshold based mechanism
will be used for detecting attacks on the IoT nodes and
services. Type of attacks detected by the agent will be net-
work scan, spoofing, injection, impersonation, DoS and DDoS
attacks. Besides a database of access control policies, there is
a database for auditing the flows in the IoT network. This is
Fig. 18. Security Attack Mitigation Process
maintained by monitoring agent with the assistance of SDN
controller. The audit trails of the IoT flows will be used by
the flow analyzer to detect malicious intrusion of the attackers
in the network. It will also propose actions to be taken by the
SDN controller with regards to the flows from IoT devices.
Figure 17. shows the outline of security attack mitigation
agent module. Security attack mitigation agent module works
as follows.
Step 1: Flows from the IoT devices via IoT controller are
accounted by the SDN controller which are monitored by the
monitoring agent.
Step 2: Auditing of the flows is taken care of by the
flow analyzer which proposes actions or defenses against a
possible malicious operation by the devices. SDN controller
then implements strategies to counter malicious activities by
the flows in future.
Attack mitigation process is shown in Figure 18. The
process is as follows
Step 1: Data flows from the devices are monitored in real
time by the monitoring agent.
Step 2: Upon detection of deviation from normal behavior
of any of the flow, Flow analyzer is notified about the deviated
flows by the monitoring agent.
Step 3: After analysis by the flow analyzer, the SDN
controller is notified to limit access of the malicious devices.
VIII. SUMMARY OF IOT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
HANDLING BY PROPOSED MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
This section describes how the proposed management
framework handles IoT security issues, requirements, threats
and attacks. Table 1. summarizes what security services are
fulfilled by the proposed framework. The modules are listed
in the column of the table while security attacks, issues and
threats in IoT are listed in the rows of the table. The table
helps in assessing which modules in the proposed framework
fulfills what security requirements, issues and threats of IoT
in the network discussed earlier. Discussion on solutions and
recommendations are as follows.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF SECURITY SERVICES PROVISIONED BY PROPOSED MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
Privacy Module Trust Module Key Management Module IoT and Service Access Authentication Access Control Security Attack Mitigation Agent
Security Attacks, Issues and Threats in IoT
Confidentiality and Privacy X X
Handling Security Attacks X
Authentication in IoT X X
Identity Spoofing Attack X
Access Control in IoT X
Trust in IoT X
Attacks on Availability
Impersonation Attacks X
Eavesdropping X X X
Data Corruption X X
Data Modification X X
Secure Routing and Forwarding in IoT X X
Robustness and resilience management in IoT X
Audit Control for IoT X
Secure Network Access X X
Secure Storage X
Tamper Resistance X
User Identification and Identity Management X
A. Confidentiality and Privacy
The SDN based security controller is responsible to facili-
tate confidentiality and privacy of data exchanged among the
IoT devices. Privacy module together with key management
module in the security framework is responsible for ensuring
protection against eavesdropping, data corruption and modi-
fication across the IoT network. Key management module is
responsible for managing cryptographic materials used by the
privacy module.
B. Handling Security Attacks
The Security attack mitigation agent is responsible for
regulating traffic within the IoT network. Constant monitoring
of the traffic flows along with the analyzer helps in detecting
DoS, DDoS, injection, spoofing and impersonation attacks.
C. Authentication in IoT
Authentication in IoT is ensured by IoT and service access
authentication together with key management module in the
security framework. The module ensures that the joining
device accessing service from the IoT network is authenticated
and authorized. Key management module is responsible for
managing cryptographic materials used by the IoT and service
access authentication module.
D. Access Control in IoT
Access control module in IoT implements security policies
in the IoT network. Hence, the module ensures that IoT device
perform authorized action while it is a part of the network.
Illegtimate access should be denied by the access control
module.
E. Trust in IoT
Trust module ensures trusted communication between IoT
devices and IoT network. An IoT device or service reputation
is downgraded if negative experiences are encountered over
time. Hence, historical actions are taken into account to
establish trusted linkage between the IoT devices and network.
F. Eavesdropping
Privacy module together with key management module
in the proposed framework ensures that the communication
between IoT devices and the gateway takes place in a secure
manner. This ensures that no malicious entity eavesdrop on
the ongoing communication. Key management module man-
ages cryptographic keys used for ensuring protection against
eavesdropping.
G. Data Corruption
Corruption of data is prevented by the privacy module which
work with key management module. The module implements
cryptographic algorithm to ensure that no malicious entity can
corrupt the data generated from the IoT devices. Cryptographic
keys used are managed by key management module.
H. Data Modification
Illegal modification of the data is ensured by privacy module
which works with key management module. Cryptographic
algorithm enables secure communication which disallows any
malicious nodes to modify the data originated from IoT
devices. Key management module is responsible for managing
cryptographic keys used by privacy module to ensure protec-
tion against illegal modification.
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I. Secure Routing and Forwarding in IoT
IoT and service access authentication module and security
attack mitigation agent ensures that the data is routed and
forwarded in the IoT network in a secure manner. Any routing
attacks are detected by the security attack mitigation agent
hence ensuring secure data forwarding. IoT and service access
authentication module filters legitimate nodes to become of the
IoT network.
J. Robustness and Resilient Management in IoT
Security attack mitigation agent detects any kind of mali-
cious attacks which halts the services offered by IoT network.
Also, the agents takes appropriate actions to alleviate the
situation hence ensuring that the IoT network runs in a normal
manner.
K. Audit Control in IoT
Security attack mitigation agent monitors the flows in the
IoT network which helps in auditing actions. If any inappro-
priate action is observed the agents reacts to the situation and
ensures smooth operation of the network.
L. Secure Network Access
IoT and service access authentication module together with
key management module authenticates all the joining nodes
hence ensuring only validated ones become part of the net-
work. Also, access control ensures only legitimate actions are
carried out by the nodes in the IoT network. Key management
module is responsible for managing cryptographic keys used
by IoT and service access authentication module.
M. Secure Storage
Access control module ensures secure access of the storage
as only legitimate nodes are able to access the data. Further-
more, these legitimate nodes perform only legal actions on the
data stored in the node.
N. Tamper Resistance
Access control module ensures any illegal tampering of the
IoT nodes in the network.
O. User identification and identity management
IoT and service access authentication module is responsible
for validating the joining nodes hence verifying the identity
of the nodes.
IX. CONCLUSION
Advancement in programmable networks have enabled
novel paradigm of SDN which have opened opportunities of
easing management of networks. Emerging interconnected em-
bedded devices paradigm of IoT is different than conventional
wired networks which are usually constrained in resources.
Hence, managing such type of network raises challenges which
are of unique nature. In this paper, management challenges
of IoT are identified and discussed . One of the aspect of
management solution for IoT is security provisioning. In this
paper, security management of IoT is dealth with. Security
threats, attacks, issues and requirements in IoT are discussed
which need attention from the researchers. Lately, potentials
of SDN to manage IoT is been investigated. It is no doubt
that SDN paradigm offer an excellent opportunity to assure
security in IoT as security control will be centralized.
Hence, in this paper, management framework based on
SDN principles for provisioning security services in IoT is
proposed. Proposed security controller consists of privacy,
trust, key management, IoT and service access authentication
and security attack mitigation agent module. Privacy module
ensures privacy is preserved in IoT. Trust module makes
sure that the communication in IoT network takes place in
a trusted environment. Key management module handles key
generation and revocation in IoT network. IoT and service
access authentication authenticates nodes and services within
IoT network. Security attack mitigation agent detects attacks
in the network and takes countermeasure actions to prevent
attacks. In the end, how the security attacks and threats in
IoT are handled by the proposed SDN based framework is
discussed. In the future, each module will be implemented and
evaluated in the framework with respect to overall overheads
and resource consumption.
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